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FOREWORD
Central Asia is a key theater in the war on terrorism. It is a
region of fragile new states, all facing a wide range of challenges.
Ungoverned regions―the cauldron of terrorism―are common. As
the U.S. State Department notes, the United States, “learned a harsh
lesson after we disengaged from Afghanistan in the early 1990s. We
must not allow countries to become breeding grounds for extremism
and terrorism. To prevent these destructive forces from taking root
in Central Asia, we have intensiﬁed our efforts to help the countries
of this area become stable, prosperous, and fully integrated members
of the world community and the global economy.” The question is
how to undertake this complex endeavor.
In this monograph, Roger N. McDermott offers a framework
for improving the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian
militaries. This includes increased and focused military training
with a special emphasis on Special Forces units. The training should
take place within a regional train and equip program to increase
effectiveness and efﬁciency. But, McDermott argues, all assistance
to the Central Asian states must complement broader diplomatic
efforts to promote social, economic, and political reform.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
to provide Army and Department of Defense leaders with ideas for
augmenting the antiterrorist capabilities of America’s partners in
Central Asia.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Political: U.S. military and security engagement programs in
the Central Asian region must complement Washington’s broader
diplomatic efforts to promote democratic, social, economic, and
political reform programs; and these ought to be part of a long-term
drive toward promoting greater stability and avoiding the risk of
failing states slipping further into trouble. The United States must
reassure its partners in the region, particularly those assisting in the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), that they will not be abandoned
at a later date, giving a more long-term commitment to assisting
the development of their young independent states, helping them
move towards democracy, strengthening them economically, and
ensuring the avoidance of a security vacuum in the region. They also
need to be reassured that the security situation in Afghanistan will
settle, and that “warlordism” and terrorism training camps will not
again ﬂourish there and serve as a training ground for many of the
terrorist groups that threaten to infest the region.
In pursuing its security strengthening and assistance programs
in the region, the United States should, directly or through NATO
(which has speciﬁc mechanisms to that effect), underscore the
common nature of the threat to each of the regional actors and seek
to encourage deeper and more widespread sharing of intelligence
within Central Asia. Furthermore, developing the antiterrorist
capabilities of these states still further should be conditional upon
closer regional cooperation and security integration; weak and
isolated states must avoid pursuing “islands of security,” rather
they must join together in a new spirit of security cooperation to
promote long-term stability in Central Asia. This must be done with
ﬁnesse in a region where there are two rival states, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan, vying for dominance and the other three, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are essentially failing states. Clearly,
the latter three states will see beneﬁt in security cooperation, but the
real challenge will be to develop a political and military base to the
assistance program that will attract the stronger states. Policymakers
must work equally strenuously to foster political and social progress
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within the region to deprive radical groups of potential local
popular support, based upon social injustice, human rights abuses,
and poverty. Security policymakers must also pay attention equally
to emerging threats within Central Asia, such as the Islamist Hizbut-Tahrir (Islamic Party of Liberation), working with its partners in
the region on preventing their full emergence, besides concentrating
on reducing or countering more pressing or immediate threats, such
as the remnants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
Military training: The conventional force capability of Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan is far superior to that of their neighbors, and this
situation will not change in the foreseeable future. U.S. training and
broader assistance efforts should avoid contributing to the military
rivalry between these two states. These future Central Asian military
assistance programs need to focus on two threat parameters:
counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations. There cannot be a
cookie cutter approach to the development of these programs, as the
effort must recognize the dramatic differences in the capabilities and
needs of each of the state’s military and security forces. These two
missions also require specialized skills, training, and equipment sets
that are not generally standard in a conventional force. U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF) should train and accompany their Central
Asian counterparts on military exercises and operations, and
attempt to train their leaders differently; in particular, leading them
to carefully examine the uses of SOF in modern warfare. Improved
in-country training, utilizing Mobile Training teams (MTTs) for the
delivery of whole unit training that addresses the needs of developing
an effective NCO corps that will in turn train their rank and ﬁle, will
encourage individual initiative and help further undermine the old
Soviet style top-down management system.
U.S. training should encompass all the SOF type units from
the various security agencies responsible for securing the country’s
border and counterterrorist operations. In many cases the military
will not have the lead in such operations, but will be supporting
another agency. The goal is to train these agencies together to
promote greater operational integration.
More training should be structured for the long term, including
help creating special warfare centers, mountain warfare/light
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infantry centers, mountain warfare leaders, common operational
skills, and an interagency communications structure to facilitate
closer integration between the military and other security agencies.
Future trainers within each state then will have the necessary skills
and education to carry out effective training without overseas
assistance. Clearly, not all of these states can afford developments of
such centers; a possible solution would be regional centers fostering
closer cooperation among the states.
Military Equipment: Military equipment supplied to the Central
Asian militaries should be targeted carefully towards achieving
improved defensive and offensive capabilities; that will entail
basic protective kit, communications, tactical intelligence, and
troop mobility. Such equipment would include light-weight and
functional body armor capable of giving adequate protection against
a 7.62mm round; body armor to protect against fragmentation
weapons; gas masks; protective head gear; night vision equipment;
thermal sights; modern sniper weapons; communication equipment
at operational and tactical level; modern individual and crew-served
weapons with sufﬁcient quantities of ammunition to train with
them; Global Position System (GPS); mobile sensors; troop carriers;
armored mobile vehicles such as the High-Mobility, Multipurpose
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) or Light Armored Vehicle (LAV); and
helicopters for greater small unit mobility. A greater effort should
be made to ensure maximum overlap between equipment given to
these militaries and that utilized in military-to-military training.
Devising a Central Asia Train and Equip Program (CATEP):
U.S. political decisionmakers and military planners are faced with
growing challenges developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the
Central Asian militaries. Consistent with U.S. policy in the Caucasus,
the United States should devise a systemic and coordinated train
and equip program in Central Asia. A CATEP would require
ﬂexibility both at the planning and implementation stages, allowing
for adaptation to the particular needs of each participating state as
well as the constructive participation from the regional militaries
themselves. The scope and cost of such a program suggests the
need to develop a multinational approach, building on the NATO
Secretary General’s efforts to enhance the alliance’s relations with
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the states in Central Asia. A NATO based supporting structure
should be formed to strengthen the program, utilizing the experience
of member states and partners in Partnership for Peace (PfP). Thus,
the burden of the assistance program would be shared. There
should be political linkage between investing in such a program and
encouraging the Central Asian militaries to cooperate more closely;
this could be especially beneﬁcial in fostering a longer-term regional
approach to security. A CATEP could be organized around regional
training centers in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. U.S. DoD ofﬁcials
should work closely with the regional MODs to assist in producing
workable blueprints for continued training after U.S. military
advisors have completed their assigned tasks. Concurrently,
U.S. policy must promote the formation of elite units within the
region, capable of meeting the future and evolving security needs
of the 21st century. As the distinction between war and peace has
blurred as a consequence of the post 9/11 security environment, a
CATEP should cultivate enhanced levels of interagency cooperation.
Evaluating the cost of such programs should be weighed against the
cost of a continued open-ended risk of having to deploy U.S. forces
in support of regional partners: these states seek to ﬁght terrorism
themselves, and not to depend on U.S. power projection in a crisis.
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COUNTERING GLOBAL TERRORISM:
DEVELOPING THE ANTITERRORIST CAPABILITIES
OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARIES
Introduction.
“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped, and defeated.”1 President George W. Bush,
addressing the U.S. Congress on September 20, 2001, highlighted
the protracted and on-going nature of combating international
terrorism on a global scale in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, (henceforth
9/11). The ensuing military campaign, which began with the violent
overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, brought the Central Asian
states, (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan) to the forefront of U.S. global strategy.2 On September
24, 2001, Turkmenistan offered transport and overﬂight rights
for humanitarian relief in support of U.S. antiterrorism efforts
in Afghanistan; there soon followed offers from Kazakhstan of
airﬁelds, bases and overﬂight rights, and subsequent proposals from
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.3
The Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev offered basing
rights to U.S. forces; the fact that no bases were created in the early
stages of the campaign was not caused by lack of trying on the part
of the Kazakh government.4 The Kazakhs did allow more than 800
overﬂights during 2002 in support of operations in Afghanistan, as
well as transshipment of supplies through its territory, and have
generally proven supportive in the war on terrorism and the conduct
of U.S. policy.5 Kazakhstan sent a small team of representatives to
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); the three ofﬁcers arrived
in June 2002 and serve there in a liaison capacity.6 Other Central
Asian states, notably Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, were
more forthcoming in their support and proved crucial in providing
bases for the projection of U.S. power into Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan
granted basing for combat and combat support units at Manas
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airport for U.S., Canadian, French, Italian, Norwegian, and South
Korean forces. Tajikistan permitted the use of its international
airport at Dushanbe for refueling and basing for U.S., British, and
French forces. Uzbekistan offered basing for U.S. forces at KarshiKhanabad and opened a land corridor for humanitarian aid to
reach Afghanistan through Termez.7 Thus, the Central Asian states
emerged as key partners in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),
and the bases established in the region proved critical to U.S. forces
securing the rapid downfall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, removing
a long-standing threat to the region. Their continued partnership will
be a signiﬁcant piece of the strategy for preventing the resurgence of
terrorism.8
On April 10, 2003, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth
Jones highlighted the continued importance of security within
Central Asia and the ongoing commitment of the U.S. Government
to the region:9
A stable, prosperous Central Asia and the Caucasus will mean a more
secure world for the American people and a more prosperous future for
the people of the region. I want to reafﬁrm in the strongest terms the
United States long-term commitment to intensive engagement in this
important region of the world. Engagement results in a classic win-win
situation for everyone. This is attainable, and we will continue to strive
for it.10

In the following monograph, recent U.S. military engagement
in Central Asia will be explored in the context of the complex
operational environment in which the countries of the region
struggle to cope with terrorism. At a time when the coalition against
global terrorism appears internally divided and many question the
beneﬁts of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. policymakers must
keep the Central Asian states focused on reform and the struggle
against terrorism. Finally, methods of furthering U.S. and western
“intensive engagement” will be examined, with an emphasis on the
development of the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian
militaries.
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Operational Environment.
The operational environment within Central Asia covers an area
of 5.8 million square kilometers (km). It includes huge expanses
of steppe and desert. This ﬂat landscape also gives way to several
mountainous areas: the Pamir range stretching 800km across
Tajikistan rises to between 5,000 to 7,000 meters (m); the Tian Shan
range extends across Kyrgyzstan through eastern Xinjiang, China.
These jagged ice-clad peaks rise to between 4,000 to 7,000m. The
region is an earthquake zone; in 1948 Ashgabat was destroyed
by a major earthquake, and in 1966 Tashkent was also leveled.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are Caspian littoral states. The road
and rail infrastructure often covering very large distances is poor,
with few hard surfaced roads, for instance, including between major
urban areas.11
Within this operational environment with its mountainous areas
and rugged terrain with many passes and transit routes known
only to locals and militants, drug trafﬁckers and criminal networks
operate and consequently overstretch the resources of the regional
security structures. Terrorists have proven resilient and manifold,
keen to promote their political goals by destabilizing the regimes
and conducting offensive operations against various targets.12
Islamic extremism has burgeoned, helping foment Civil War in
Tajikistan between 1992-97 and insurgencies within the Batken
region in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, as well as the series of
bombings in Tashkent in 1997 and 1999. Although these were closely
associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), other
dangerous groups have emerged. These include Hizb-ut-Tahrir al
Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), a professed nonviolent Islamic
movement, and its early splinter group, Akromiylar, established
in 1997 by Yuldashev Akrom, whose aims range from establishing
an Islamic Caliphate throughout the region based on Shariah law
to overthrowing the government of Uzbekistan. In 1999 a more
secretive splinter group from Hizb-ut-Tahrir was established by
Mirzazhanov Atoyevich, again advocating the violent overthrow of
the Central Asian governments. Additional groups known to operate
in the Ferghana valley (which straddles Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan) include Adolat Uyushmasi, Islam Lashkarlari, Tovba,
3

Nur (Ray of Light), Tabliqh (Mission), and Uzum Sokol (Long
Beard).13
IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.
Russian intelligence, like their counterparts in Central Asia,
have long monitored the activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, expressing
concern about the group’s radical tendencies and its espoused
aim of overthrowing secular governments in Central Asia. Indeed,
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested more than 100
members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Moscow in June 2003. According to
Sergey Ignatchenko, head of the FSB Public Relations Center, two
members were charged. The Kyrgyz arrested member was alleged
to have possessed 100 grams of plastic explosive and 3 grenades,
while the Tajik member was alleged to have 400 grams of TNT
and two detonators with Bickford fuses―both men also possessed
propaganda literature.14 After the discovery of the weapons cache in
Moscow, other Western states stepped up their surveillance of Hizbut-Tahrir within their own countries. Henning Fode, the Danish
Solicitor General, conﬁrmed that Denmark is considering following
Germany by proscribing the group, already declared as a terrorist
organization in the Russian Federation. Intelligence services in the
Ukraine―particularly in the Crimea where there is a large Muslim
population―have begun monitoring it. Hizb-ut-Tahrir is also banned
in the Gulf states.
There is little doubt that the Central Asian Republics perceive the
existence of a continued and difﬁcult to quantify threat from regional
terrorists, though concerns have been raised that they overstate the
case against Hizb-ut-Tahrir to justify repression. Nevertheless, from
within the ranks of this secretive Islamic group, a vast residue of
potential recruits for terrorism exists. Preventing its emergence as
a new terrorist organization would be consistent with the broader
aims of the GWOT.15
Overlap between the various militant groups is not difﬁcult to
ﬁnd, nor is it surprising. The Islamic Party of Tajikistan was thought
to have been formed from the remnants of the IMU after ﬁghting
in Afghanistan during the fall of 2001. This group contains Uzbek,
Kyrgyz, and Tajik militants and could even contain the ubiquitous
4

Chechens.16 Likewise the IMU is reported to contain Afghans,
Chechens, Tajiks, and Uighurs, and has received ﬁnancial support
from Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, many of whom are experienced
veterans of guerrilla conﬂicts in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Kyrgyz
Defense Minister Esen Topoyev believes that Taliban remnants and
IMU members have merged to form a “new” structure, the Islamic
Movement of Turkestan (IMT), which in fact simply represents the
IMU under a different name.17 In Kyrgyzstan in December 2002 and
May 2003 a series of bombings took place, resulting in 8 people
killed and 40 injuries; these attacks have been attributed to the IMT.18
But fears of a resurgence of the IMU continue to haunt the Central
Asian Republics. In June 2003 the Kyrgyz National Security Service
(KNB) discovered weapons belonging to the IMU in the Itijaz Gorge
of the Batken containing ordnance of Soviet, Iranian and Pakistani
origin. Kyrgyz intelligence suspects these weapons were left there
for possible use by the IMU.19 Tokon Mamytov, deputy chairman of
the Kyrgyz KNB, was in little doubt that these weapons caches were
linked to the IMU, and furthermore, he intimated that intelligence
links IMU with Chinese terrorists. Mamytov also disclosed that
terrorists within Central Asia have received $400,000 in funding
from other international terrorist organizations during the ﬁrst 6
months of 2003.20
Other dangerous radical extremist groups such as the Uighur
separatists, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), in XinjaingUighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), China, maintain links with the
IMU.21 In July 2003, Chairman of the Kazakh KNB Nartai Dutbayev
conﬁrmed the increased activity of IMU in Kazakhstan, resulting
in increased surveillance and monitoring of their movements. In
southern Kazakhstan, according to Dutbayev, Chinese separatists
are also becoming more organized and causing concern for the
Kazakh authorities; consequently a number of Uighurs were
detained by the KNB, which reportedly conﬁscated weapons,
ordnance, and home-made explosives.22 The Uzbek National
Security Service (SNB) reportedly tracked over 600 members of the
IMU to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Chechnya.23 Recent discoveries
of weapons caches in the Batken Region of Kyrgyzstan will only
further fuel such concerns.24 The existence of these terrorist groups,
religious extremists, and separatists provides security interests for
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regional powers such as Russia and China, both keen to achieve
regional stability and minimize the potential spillover effect of
political violence into their own territories.25
Hizb-ut-Tahrir represents a potential threat within the region,
not simply insofar as it espouses the aim of overthrowing the Central
Asian governments, but also in its links to international and regional
terrorists. It openly spreads its propaganda against these states, as
well as promoting anti-Semitism and spreading propaganda against
the United States and the United Kingdom. Hizb-ut-Tahrir uses
its international headquarters in London to orchestrate its global
activities in more than 40 countries. Since the beginning of the
GWOT, it has strongly opposed the presence of U.S. and coalition
military forces deployed in Central Asia.26
An important focus of the GWOT is on emerging terrorist threats
to U.S. interests overseas, as well as seeking to deny international
terrorists the opportunity to launch global operations. During his
national address on September 20, 2001, U.S. President George W.
Bush linked al Qaeda and the Taliban directly to the IMU.27 Indeed,
the nature of such links, long suspected by regional intelligence
services, points to a potentially explosive nexus of militant
Islamic groups, drug trafﬁckers, and criminal groups. The Central
Asian states will need ongoing assistance in assessing, analyzing,
identifying, and countering this historical and evolving threat.
The activities of Hizb-ut-Tahrir within Central Asia have
reportedly increased since the war in Iraq (Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM). This has been related largely to the dissemination of
propaganda against the west and the countries within the region
supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).28 Despite the
undoubted success of OEF in decimating the IMU, a risk remains of
Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU cooperating with al Qaeda remnants
and a dangerous radical Islamic terrorist threat emerging within
Central Asia.29 Although scholars such as Ahmed Rashid have
highlighted this very danger of disparate militant Islamists uniting
to form a new terrorist organization, in reality a high level of disunity
among these groups makes it unlikely to succeed.30 What is clear,
however, is that the criminal gangs, narcotics barons, and religious
ideologues endemic in Central Asia, notably in the Ferghana valley,
will continue to foment terrorism for the foreseeable future.31
6

Counterterrorism: Police and Intelligence Factors.
Counterterrorism within any modern state involves the use of
police-based operations leading to investigation and conviction
through the criminal courts. Currently the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is developing regional
counterterrorist legislation.32 A police-led investigative approach,
depending upon the timely gathering and use of intelligence, is a
vital preventative measure and part of a process of professionally
dealing with terrorist incidents in a way that does not foment
further support for the terrorists’ cause among the local population.
Nonetheless, the police forces in Central Asia, which are inherently
corrupt and lacking professional experience in dealing with the
intelligence-gathering process and the construction of databases,
desperately need reform.
A reformed police structure could increase the efﬁciency in
dealing with actual incidents and bring to justice those responsible for
utilizing political violence. It would also have the distinct advantage
of avoiding arrests and incarceration on a grand scale which often
increases public support or sympathy for the terrorist cause. The
heavy-handed pounding of Chechen villages and widespread
destruction inﬂicted by the Russian armed forces during what it
describes as a “counterterrorist operation” has had reverberations
beyond the region, generating sympathy among Islamic extremists,
human rights campaigners, and others throughout the world.
A police- and intelligence-led strategy, with the military only
involved when necessary, is an important element of counterterrorism for a modern state. The Central Asian states can be assisted
in this by more contacts and liaison with western counterterrorist
specialists and national police and intelligence services. The
experience of the British Special Branch police in countering Irish
Republican terrorism for more than 30 years, and the Antiterrorist
Branch’s forensic and investigative skills can be shared with the
Central Asian states.33 Equally, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States
can share their experience.34 The post 9/11-security environment
demands improved intelligence cooperation, not just between
7

agencies but between nations. Precedents do exist. The UKUSA
Agreement, signed in June 1948 between the United States, the
UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, authorized the sharing
of signals intelligence among its signatories. The NATO Special
Committee (AC/46), established by the North Atlantic Council in
1952, provides a long established intelligence exchange mechanism
between allies. Despite these multilateral mechanisms, the bilateral
sharing of intelligence has always been the preferred and more
effective route. In Central Asia, agreements exist between the
regional security agencies that supply a theoretical basis for sharing
intelligence, but in practice it is limited in its scope and nowhere
near effective enough.35
The Experience of Terrorism in 1999/2000.
With weak armed forces and security structures, the antiterrorist
operations conducted by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999 and
2000 were rendered ineffective by militant incursions. In 1999 the
IMU raised more than $3 million by kidnapping four Japanese
geologists, and a further $50,000 for three Kyrgyz district ofﬁcials,
including General Anarbek Shamkeyev, the commander of the
Kyrgyz Interior Ministry troops, during an incursion into the Batken
Region. The funding of the IMU includes money raised from drug
trafﬁcking in the region.
The IMU incursion into the Batken in 1999 left deep wounds
within the region. The memory is still fresh, along with the failures
of the local forces to combat them effectively, especially within the
security forces and militaries. In the summer of 1999 approximately
800 IMU members launched well-planned incursions into the
Batken, apparently in an effort to establish a forward base for future
operations against Uzbekistan.36 In the following summer of 2000,
a smaller force of around 100 IMU members launched another
incursion, attacking Kyrgyz security forces and seizing villages
in Uzbekistan where 27 soldiers were killed.37 The three-pronged
attack came close to Tashkent, and saw a repetition of rebel demands
for the overthrow of Karimov’s government and the establishment
of an Islamic state governed by Shariah law.38
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Weaknesses of the Military Campaigns.
Kyrgyz security structures failed to cope adequately with
the challenge of well-organized terrorists utilizing the tactics of
guerrilla warfare. Moreover, the terrorists effectively used the
rugged, sparsely populated terrain to mask their movement into
and out of Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz military was severely hampered
in its ability to ﬁnd, ﬁx, and engage enemy forces, lacking vital
intelligence or reconnaissance assets as well as operational mobility.
Enemy forces also successfully used the cover of darkness to move,
while the Kyrgyz units deployed were powerless to respond in the
absence of any night ﬁghting capability.39
In this context, the Kyrgyz armed forces proved unable to
rapidly contain the crisis, which escalated as time passed. Reporting
indicated the Kyrgyz military employed artillery against the terrorist
camps, only to ﬁnd they were earlier abandoned. While Kyrgyz
soldiers, often inexperienced conscripts, searched for the militants,
the enemy maintained the initiative and engaged in sporadic attacks
on the soldiers. According to some Kyrgyz soldiers, they felt that the
militants could have picked off more soldiers had they chosen to do
so.40
Poorly trained Kyrgyz conscripts had dated communications
equipment and old Soviet riﬂes which, in some cases, lacked sights.41
Undeniably Kyrgyz soldiers were not adequately trained or properly
equipped to conduct effective combat operations. In response to
these setbacks, a battalion was speedily constructed in Koi-Tash in
September 1999 consisting of conscripts, volunteers, and veterans of
the Soviet-Afghan war. It was rushed into the ﬁeld without a night
ﬁghting capability, inferior air support, poor communication and
intelligence, no body armor, proper maps of the area, or essential
rations, and with helmets incapable of withstanding a round from
a Kalashnikov assault riﬂe.42 Many reportedly felt exposed and at
risk. They faced a determined enemy armed with light weapons
and night vision goggles, who was prepared for a lengthy armed
struggle.43 The militants’ rations included dried fruit and other
easily transportable foodstuffs, from which the Kyrgyz MoD learned
the necessity of improving the rations for their soldiers in the ﬁeld.44
In terms of cost to the Kyrgyz economy, the Batken campaign in 1999
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consumed around one-third of the defense budget. More costly still
was the singular lesson it had taught the government and military:
Kyrgyzstan simply did not possess the forces capable of neutralizing
the terrorists. Despite proposals for reform by analysts close to the
government, including restructuring and reequipping the armed
forces, President Akayev could only offer vague commitments to
creating “small, mobile forces” capable of rapid reaction in a crisis.45
The promises were there, but the assets―trained and experienced
personnel and equipment―necessary to fulﬁll these promises were
not.
The IMU incursions of 1999, which took several months to resolve
and cost the lives of many Kyrgyz and Uzbek servicemen, were being
evaluated throughout the region when the situation reoccurred
in the summer of 2000. This time, tentative plans, agreed between
the states in the aftermath of events in the Batken in 1999, were for
the regional militaries to cooperate on operations and intelligence
to resolve the crisis.46 In theory, the cooperation pledges involved
the formation of a coordination center for the security agencies in
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Bishkek’s proposal to unite
and form a joint task force to destroy the terrorists quickly exposed
the tenuous nature of regional military cooperation; as the prospect
of a joint task force fell apart an appeal was made by the presidents
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Russian
support based on previous antiterrorist agreements. The Central
Asian Republics were unable to integrate the response of their own
security agencies closely, or cooperate with neighbors to counter the
resurgent threat to national security from the IMU successfully.47
During military operations in August 2000, IMU members were
allowed to escape during the incursion into the Surkhandarya
region of Uzbekistan, owing to inaccurate Soviet maps of the local
area being used by the Uzbek and Kyrgyz armies that precluded
accurate coordination and accurate force on target.48 Kyrgyz
“Scorpion” Special Forces were deployed to the Kyrgyz-Uzbek
border areas, working with the local administrations in efforts to
subdue the militant activity. Additional border posts were set up
along the frontier with Tajikistan, and local guides were used.49
Although the response to the incursion in 2000 was more effective
than the previous year, it revealed the continued weaknesses of
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the Kyrgyz security forces and served as a stark reminder of the
imbalance within the region; Uzbek armed forces were better able
to coordinate their efforts among border troops, Special Forces units
from the MOD, MVD, and SNB.50
The identiﬁed operational weaknesses from the military
campaigns against the IMU incursions in both 1999 and 2000 can be
summarized as follows:
• Failure at the planning and implementation stages to properly
coordinate the deployment and operational activities of the
armed forces between the various power ministries.
• Absence of well-trained, mobile, combat-ready soldiers capable
of effectively conducting operations in mountainous terrain.
• Lack of basic protective kit for soldiers deployed to carry out
combat. Poor equipment and communication systems in the
ﬁeld.
• Inferior quality military intelligence resulting from the lack of
operational and tactical intelligence and reconnaissance assets.
• Poor targeting information, which prohibited ﬁnding, ﬁxing,
targeting, and then effectively engaging enemy forces. The
process remains too slow and cumbersome to provide timely
targeting data to either air or ground assets.
• Support from air assets was sporadic, inaccurate, and
unproductive, degrading the morale of ground forces.
• SOF did not play the lead role in operations, being used instead
as light infantry.
• Limited transnational military cooperation rendering ineffectual
any efforts to pursue ﬂeeing insurgents, or contain the conﬂict.
• Failure to achieve a synergy of the armed forces deployed in the
Batken region or gain full spectrum dominance over the enemy.
Russia’s Role in Central Asia: Promoting Stability.
President Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia promising
to resolve the Chechen crisis, and had staked his reputation on a
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tough approach to terrorism. Russia rightly has regarded the former
Soviet Republics in Central Asia as a source of instability and sought
to promote ways of countering the spread of Islamic militancy,
terrorism, narcotics trafﬁcking, and criminality from these states
into Russia. Moscow thus has committed itself to supporting border
security within Tajikistan, basing a Federal Border Guard group along
the Tajik-Afghan border, and continuing to station its 201st Motor
Riﬂe Division (MRD) in Dushanbe.51 Despite being professional,
the 201st MRD suffers from a host of problems symptomatic of the
malaise in the modern Russian armed forces: under ﬁnancing, a
shortage of new equipment, difﬁculties in retaining new recruits,
undermanning, poor health among recruits, low morale, and no
ﬁeld training above that of battalion level. Consequently it fails to
maintain a high level of combat readiness, despite its supportive
role in conjunction with the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS)
in bolstering Tajik border security.52 The FPS has now been placed
under Russia’s FSB as a result of the Putin’s reforms in March 2003.
Russia’s military presence within Central Asia has provided
important leverage over the countries, but did not prevent the
stationing of U.S. and coalition forces in support of OEF.53 Thus,
Moscow perceived that it had lost out in the “zero-sum” game, and
its inﬂuence had waned in the region.54 Despite this, Moscow has
doggedly attempted to reassert its security agenda within Central
Asia, principally through multilateral CIS bodies created before
9/11. These institutions, such as the Collective Security Treaty
(CST),55 while generally eliciting support in the region’s capitals,
have been undermined by a sense that they are mere “paper”
organizations and critically by Uzbekistan’s decision in 1999 to
withdraw from the CST.56
After years of paper agreements calling for cooperation against
regional and international terrorism, in April 2003, at the Dushanbe
summit of the CST members, the body was transformed into a new
political-military body: the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). Members agreed that a united headquarters for the
organization would be formed in Moscow in January 2004, headed
by Russian General Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff.57
Its charter contains a NATO-like provision for a joint response to
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aggression against any member state. Secretary-General of the CSTO
Council Colonel-General Nikolai Bordyuzha is a former Secretary of
the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Director of the
FPS.58 Indeed, Russia has agreed to ﬁnance 50 percent of the CSTOs
activities, with the other members each contributing 10 percent.
Furthermore, the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF)
created under the CST is placed under the command of the Russian
Major-General Sergey Chernomordin.59 Since its inception on May
25, 2001, the CRDF, with its headquarters in Bishkek, was tasked
with providing a security mechanism for defense against regional
terrorism within Central Asia, capable of deployment across the
borders of its members.60 Although the CRDF are to be based on
designated components of the militaries of the member states―
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia―in reality the
reaction force is built around the 201st MRD in Dushanbe; battalions
from the other signatories in Central Asia initially totaling 1,300
personnel join a battalion from the 201st MRD.61 Thus, although the
CRDF is a regional multilateral force, in practice it is Russian funded
and designed and built around a Russian combat formation and
presumably its division’s support structure.
Attempts to improve the potential effectiveness of the CRDF
have not been restricted to political efforts to strengthen the
CSTO, they have manifested in an agreement between Russia and
Kyrgyzstan to create an aviation component to support the CRDF,
through a joint base at Kant, 20 km east of Bishkek. The Russian
air force ﬁrst deployed to Kant in late 2002 in order to test facilities
before the formal opening the joint Russian-Kyrgyz base in October
2003. Bishkek has both Washington and Moscow vying to maintain
a military presence in Kyrgyzstan. They are currently playing a
difﬁcult game, walking a security tightrope between the two in an
effort to secure access to much-needed military assistance and to
enhance their own long-term security.62
Antiterrorist cooperation within the CIS developed in response
to the increased threat posed by Islamic militancy within the former
Soviet Union. The ﬁrst “Agreement on Cooperation in the Fight
Against Crime,” containing a provision against terrorism, was
signed on November 25, 1998. This paved the way for a CIS Treaty
on Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism in June 1999, and in
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June 2000 the Presidents’ Council approved a program for combating
international terrorism until 2003.63 A CIS Antiterrorist Center (ATC)
was formed at that time under the command of Russian LieutenantGeneral Boris Mylnikov, with a staff of 60 based in Moscow. It
functions as an information support structure, holding information
in a database on terrorists and terrorists groups operating within
the CIS facilitating interaction among the antiterrorist agencies of
CIS member states.64 The CIS ATC has an ofﬁce in Bishkek, which
collects information on terrorists and acts as a focal point for
information gathering and dissemination in Central Asia. It runs at
an estimated annual cost of $821,226.65 However, given the troubled
history of intelligence sharing and cooperation between the Central
Asian states, it remains unclear how effective the ATC is in practical
terms.66
CSTO Military Exercises.
The CRDF remains untested in conﬂict, making any assessment
of its actual capabilities subject to real world developments. Its
military exercises reveal much concerning how it may be used in a
crisis. For example, SOUTH ANTITERROR 2002 featured a series of
operational-tactical exercises held in Kyrgyzstan in April 2002. The
regional ATC based in Bishkek was also a key player in the exercises,
supported by the national components of the CRDF using heavy
ground equipment, combat aircraft, and air defense systems.67 The
tactics used in these exercises implied a potentially heavy-handed
and inefﬁcient way of combating terrorists and suggested that little
new thinking existed in the potential use of the CRDF. Tashkent,
meanwhile, has made known its view that the training exercises
were irrelevant, vehemently opposing the emergence of what it
perceives as military blocs within Central Asia.68
Similarly high proﬁle command and staff exercises were held in
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan June 13-16, 2002. SOUTHERN SHEILD
OF THE COMMONWEALTH 2002 rehearsed combating terrorist
incursions within the region. Participation included ground forces,
Special Forces and aviation. A battalion from the 201st MRD in
Tajikistan represented Russia. Kazakhstan contributed an airborne
assault company, and the Kyrgyz supplied a mountain infantry
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battalion, its “Scorpion” Special Forces and Mi-8 helicopters.69
Despite these military exercises and the public statements regarding
its capacity to react robustly to terrorism, doubts remain concerning
the CRDFs ability to respond to any future crisis.
In addition, antiterrorist exercises are periodically conducted
under the direction of the FSB, in cooperation with the ATC and
regional power structures. These exercises usually involve a re-run
of events similar to the Batken incursions in 1999 and 2000, with
terrorists leading an incursion in large numbers, meeting with a
response from air and ground assets.70 More rarely, they entail
hostage rescue, storming a building, or ending a siege. Scenarios
appear stilted, often showing little awareness of the terrorists’
capacity to alter chosen tactics. The exercises are Russian organized,
led, coordinated, ﬁnanced, and utilized, therefore, Russian methods
of counterterrorism are employed―which, if the campaigns in
Chechnya are considered, revolve around disproportionate tactics
that in long run only fan the ﬂames of terrorism through the levels of
civilian and collateral damage inﬂicted.71
One new feature of CRDF military exercises, however, was
revealed in April 2003, when evidence emerged that Russian
military planners were attempting to learn from OEF and Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM. During exercises held in southern Tajikistan,
information warfare (IW) techniques saw the deployment of an
experimental mobile TV and radio station72 on the ﬁring range in
Tajikistan, in clear recognition of the need to conduct IW concurrent
with antiterrorist combat operations. It reportedly acted as a
reliable communication center and had the capacity to jam enemy
broadcasts.73 These changes demonstrate the desire to use Russia’s
experience with IW in Chechnya, and avoid repeating the same
mistakes; more signiﬁcantly it highlights a recognition within the
Russian military for the need to gain information dominance within
the theater of operations, minimizing the risk of sympathy for the
terrorists’ cause spreading among the local population―helping to
localize the conﬂict. According to Major-General Chernomordin,
commander of the CRDF, plans exist to standardize communications
equipment among the participants of the CRDF, since the lack of
standardized equipment has presented command and control,
and coordination problems.74 SOUTHERN SHIELD OF THE
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COMMONWEALTH exercises under the command of the CSTO,
focusing on counterterrorism, scheduled for late 2003, with more
exercises planned for 2004.75
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Chinese Inﬂuence.
Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),76
formerly known as the Shanghai Five, existed principally to address
issues stemming from border security and delineation, the Alliance,
with the guidance of its leading members, Russia and China, has
developed an interest in countering regional and international
terrorism.77 Various SCO declarations have reiterated the intention
of member states to work together to promote a UN-based approach
to countering terrorism.78 Thus it acts as a forum within which the
Russian and Chinese governments can seek to equate their own
domestic experience of terrorism, in Chechnya and Xinjiang, with
the GWOT, while the Central Asian states use the opportunity to
balance the regional inﬂuences of Moscow and Beijing.79 The SCO
has also formed its own ATC. Scheduled to open in January 2004
in Tashkent, it has established a secretariat in Beijing, which will
work closely with its CIS counterpart.80 China and Russia will each
contribute between 32-38 percent of the costs for the ATC, with the
rest being shared among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. Consequently, most of its staff will come from China
and Russia with the other SCO participants contributing technical
personnel.81
Thus, China is gradually becoming engaged in regional political
and military efforts to combat terrorism. This was highlighted in
China’s historic participation in joint SCO-sponsored antiterrorist
military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in October 2002. These exercises
took place in the border areas between China and Kyrgyzstan; the
ﬁrst part of the exercise was conducted in the Sary-Tash Gorge in
Kyrgyzstan and the second in China’s Lanzhou Province. Border
guards, supported by helicopters and tanks used in the exercises,
were observed by the CIS ATC, testing their cooperative capabilities.
The exercise’s scenario focused on eliminating terrorists entering
and operating in each of their countries.82 At an SCO summit held in
Moscow, SCO defense ministers met on May 29, 2003, reaching an
16

agreement on the participation of China in the SCOs ﬁrst multilateral
military exercises focusing on antiterrorism. In August 2003,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined China and Russia
in the conduct of COOPERATION-2003, setting up an “antiterrorist
joint headquarters” deploying combat units along the Sino-Kazakh
border.83 Russia and China agreed to work closely to foster a more
coordinated approach to countering terrorism. Believing they share
common interests in this area, they will emphasize more effective
cooperation between the two ATCs as well as upgrading the
interaction between antiterrorist agencies in both Russia and China.84
Nonetheless, Uzbekistan’s refusal to play any part in these military
exercises weakens the SCOs’ attempts to promote such multilateral
initiatives.
It is apparent that, while Russia remains militarily engaged in
Chechnya, it will be in no position to conduct any major or signiﬁcant
military operations beyond its territory.85 The conduct of such
operations, which it is committed to on paper through the CRDF,
would not only be Russian-led but perhaps also presage a political
price for such support exacted upon the regional states. In any case,
Moscow’s efforts to date have been aimed, however imperfectly, at
achieving regional stability. Russian security assistance within the
region is restricted by continued economic constraints and its own
efforts to reform its armed forces, leaving it in a limited position to
lend moral and political support to regional states seeking to build
professional armies. Russia lacks experience in this ﬁeld, struggling
as it is with the Herculean task of professionalizing its own army―an
experiment still in its infancy in Russia after more than a decade of
discussion and aborted efforts.86
In fact, there need not be a clash of interests within the region,
between the United States and Russia. Indeed, the United States
and NATO engagement programs and Russia’s security interests
pursued bilaterally and through the CSTO all share a common
aim, namely the promotion of greater security and stability within
the region. Security can only be pursued and enhanced through
cooperation, not competition. General Anthony Zinni, former
commander of U.S. CENTCOM, noted the following about the
convergence of security interests, particularly in addressing the
threat of Islamic militancy: “I think the conduct of those operations
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against terrorism, and eventually dealing with the drug trade is
both in the United States and Russian interests.”87 Russia will seek
to expand its security interests in Central Asia for the foreseeable
future, while China will become more actively engaged, reﬂecting its
growing economic interests as well as its security concerns related to
Uighur separatists.
Antiterrorist Capabilities in Central Asia.

US$ Millions

Military reform has been prioritized within the Central Asian
militaries in the context of the growing international security interest
in the region, coping with the problems linked to Soviet legacy
forces, domestic economic constraints, and recognition of a ﬂuid and
volatile threat environment. The most marked progress has been in
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, while the others have lagged behind,
reﬂecting their economic and political weakness.
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Figure 1. Defense Budgets in Central Asia.
As the graphic above illustrates, defense budgets within the
region have ﬂuctuated during the last decade, though Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan have remained consistently above the smaller
regional militaries―reﬂecting their larger countries and economies.

18

Allowing for inconsistency in the reported defense ﬁgures and the
problems of the ﬁgures in The Military Balance, these ﬁgures broadly
support the picture of inadequately funded militaries. Kazakhstan’s
defense budgets in 1992-93 were disproportionately large (1992:
$1,480 million and 1993: $707 million). These out-of-range ﬁgures
are tied principally to the nuclear weapons they inherited from the
USSR, and the budget began to stabilize itself once they had agreed
to get rid of them. The early attempts to maintain large legacy
forces may explain the dip toward the mid 1990s, which presaged
the subsequent lowering of defense budgets. Fluctuations in the
ﬁgures for Uzbekistan reﬂect its evolving military reform priorities
combined with the exclusion, since 1999, of “other troops” (MVD,
Border Guards, etc.) from the budget. The defense budgets in
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan have been largely static
throughout the period.
Although these defense budgets are generally small, they exclude
spending items that would be included in a defense budget of a
NATO member state. They also conceal greater spending potential
in the local currency, as well as privileges extended to servicemen
such as tax exemptions.88 The average defense budget in the period,
for the leading militaries, represents one-third to one-half the size
of the defense budget of the smallest NATO members, excluding
Luxembourg.89 It is clear, therefore, that the Central Asian Republics
cannot afford broad-scale conventional force modernization, but can
afford to focus on the development of small, elite formations that are
more professional and combat capable. This will need the full support
of foreign assistance programs and the maintenance of closer links
with the region’s militaries and security forces, emphasizing followup work and more multilateral military exercises maximizing their
exposure to foreign militaries.
Force Structures.
Among the Central Asian states, the militaries’ efforts to combat
terrorists incursions have generally employed Soviet legacy forces
that were structured and equipped for Moscow’s conventional
wars. Much of this heavy force structure is ill-equipped for
unconventional, guerrilla type conﬂict. Where they existed or are
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being constituted, the militaries are ﬁnding that their elite, more
professional and better trained, lightly armored, and more mobile
formations (most likely special operations forces) are best suited
to confront this type of threat. This kind of formation often has
a speciﬁc or more narrow mission orientation than traditional
conventional units. Undoubtedly, the most competent and battle
ready of the regional Special Operation Forces (SOF)90 are those of
the Republic of Uzbekistan. Like their counterparts throughout the
region, these units are under the control of the various state “power
ministries,” immediately raising problems of effective coordination
and deployment. The Ministry of Internal Affairs’ (MVD) Special
Purpose Forces (OMON) are in essence the paramilitary arm of the
police and are similarly structured to their Soviet predecessor. An
MVD Special Forces company also is based in Tashkent as well as the
Special Forces under the operational control of the National Security
Service (SNB).91 However, in Uzbekistan the SOF which are most
effective and well-trained are the SOF Battalions under the MOD.
Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan is placed under the operational
control of the SNB and the armed forces support them as needed;
under certain circumstances for a speciﬁc mission or campaign they
could be placed under the operational command of the military.92
In Kazakhstan the National Security Service (KNB) has
operational control of its antiterrorist “Aristan” (Lion) unit based
in Astana. The KNB oversees the police volunteer units known as
“Sarbazy” (Warriors), which operate within the local districts. In
addition, the police units (OMON) also support antiterrorist tasks
and include a “rapid reaction” group “Kyran” (Eagle), which has
10 teams deployed in Almaty. The MVD also controls its Alpha, or
renamed KGB units with bases in Almaty and Semey including two
Special Forces units: “Sunkar” (Hawk) and “Berkut” (Golden Eagle).
Its MOD SOF is also based in Almaty and Semey. Operational control
for counterterrorism in Kazakhstan is currently shared by the MOD
and MVD, but it is likely that in future the KNB will be assigned this
position.93 This pattern for the organization and operational control
of SOF in Central Asia is also replicated in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan
and Turkmenistan.94
Throughout the region, SOF is affected by “Soviet thinking”
within the older generation of ofﬁcers. This is especially signiﬁcant
20

since it acts as a constraint on efforts to enhance the operational
capabilities of these forces. However, key skills tend to be found
among these older Soviet and Russian trained ofﬁcers.
U.S. SOF can be used in a variety of ways and have excellent
capabilities against terrorists. They are light, mobile, and trained
to work well with the local populace; tailored for deep and longrange reconnaissance; and trained and equipped to identify, target
and designate, if needed, terrorist groups and their operating bases.
They can maximize the use of conventional assets while minimizing
the loss of life among civilians. U.S. SOF often operate in small
teams, performing reconnaissance missions as well as direct action
against enemy targets. They need operational mobility and good
communications to keep them within range, responding quickly to
terrorist activity and a ﬂuid “front-line.”
The Central Asian states do not yet possess the mobility or
communications, essential equipment, and training to support the
development of highly combat-ready SOF.95 One key is their inability
to recognize the battle utility of SOF operating in small groups. Such
a transformation will necessitate the reform of the structure, doctrine
and thinking of the commanding ofﬁcers, who need to learn the
importance of “bottom up” initiative from the junior ranks.
In 1993, the 7th Special Operations Squadron toured the Central
Asian states, supplying initial U.S. SOF contacts with the newly
independent former Soviet Republics of Central Asia.96 U.S. military
links with the region in the 1990s developed most with Uzbekistan
on a bilateral basis and through multilateral military exercises
utilizing NATO’s PfP.97 Since 1999, however, the ﬁve Central Asian
states have been in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR)98
and U.S. SOF that deploy to the region are under the operational
control of Special Operations Command-Central (SOCCENT) based
at MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida. Since then U.S. SOF have been the
lead provider of military-to-military training of the Central Asian
militaries.99 12-man A-teams deliver training in the host nation for a
month at a time four times each year, with the focus on patrolling,
small arms and explosives and small unit skills. These links were
crucial politically in gaining the support offered by the Central
Asian states for OEF.100 Understandably, given the energy and
security interests of the United States in the Caspian Sea, levels of
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ﬁnancial assistance through existing programs rose steadily during
the 1990s. U.S. funded security programs for Central Asia totaled
$356,120,000 during 1992-2001.101 Assistance increased still further
after 9/11. All of the states receive Foreign Military Financing (FMF),
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and since
2002 became eligible to receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) on a
grant basis.102 In 2002, FMF to the region was as follows: Kazakhstan,
$4,750,000; Kyrgyzstan, $11,000,000; Tajikistan, $3,700,000; and
Uzbekistan, $36,210,000.103 IMET funds: Kazakhstan, $800,000;
Kyrgyzstan, $600,000; Tajikistan, $250,000; Turkmenistan, $450,000;
and Uzbekistan, $1,000,000.104
These levels of funding have gone some way to furthering
U.S. military engagement within the region, but the programs
and training given have had to face the harsh realities of poor,
underfunded post-Soviet militaries. Although some of the facilities
within which training occurred were reportedly very good,105 the
quality of the soldiers in the indigenous militaries often left a lot
to be desired. For example, the Kazakh soldiers receiving training
from U.S. SOF in 2002 were alleged by some trainers to be of poor
quality.106 The nature of this training has not always speciﬁcally
targeted the antiterrorist side of these militaries, instead training
border and peacekeeping troops in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan. In January and February 2003, U.S. SOF conducted
joint military exercises in Kyrgyzstan, called BALANCE KNIGHT,
which included the Kyrgyz National Guard (MVD) and the Kyrgyz
SOF “Scorpion” battalion. During BALANCE KNIGHT, shooting,
mountaineering, rapid response, helicopter maneuvers, and medical
and engineering skills were drilled.107
Uzbek Special Forces.
Uzbek armed forces, particularly its Special Forces, are regarded
as the most effective in the region. Its MOD SOF are organized into
seven battalions with the brigade headquarters in Tashkent; these
battalions are not under the command of the Military Districts and
have responsibilities along Uzbekistan’s borders. All Uzbek SOF
battalions are professional, with their servicemen signing 3-year
contracts. Yet in training and operations, they are utilized as light
infantry.108
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In 2000 in Surkhandarya, for example, they were inserted in small
teams and took casualties while attempting to confront the IMU in
well-prepared defensive positions. During the operation they were
utilized as light infantry, pushing the IMU into hard terrain before
calling in air and artillery strikes. Although they eliminated the small
group of IMU guerrillas, the local population had to be evacuated,
allowing sympathy to grow for the insurgents and their cause.109
Thus, Uzbek SOF were essentially misused, failing to ﬁx and locate
the enemy and call in conventional light infantry and close air
support to wipe out their targets. The Uzbek SOF, professional and
the most advanced in the region, may have expanded too rapidly,
sacriﬁcing quality for quantity. Clearly they need more effective
reform programs, to include better counterterrorist training, reﬁned
tactics, critical equiptment items, etc.
The United States has given critical support to the Central Asian
militaries, but this can be developed still further through training,
providing equipment, and promoting intelligence cooperation, both
within the region itself and internationally. In what follows, some of
the shortcomings of U.S. military engagement will be highlighted
and the continued weakness of the antiterrorist capabilities of the
Central Asian states will be explored before suggesting a roadmap
for markedly enhancing these capabilities in the future.
Training and Equipment.
The Central Asian Republics with the least effective SOF
are those that have received less exposure to U.S. and western
militaries either through bilateral training or NATO’s PfP activities.
Consequently, the least combat-ready forces in the region are those
in Turkmenistan, closely followed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.
The majority of SOF training in Tajikistan has been geared
towards the enhancement of the Tajik border guards (KOGG) and
the OMON unit of the MVD. However, if properly and thoroughly
trained through U.S. assistance programs, these forces could
become very effective as covert operators, gathering intelligence
and helping to prevent speciﬁc events. Achieving this will involve a
comprehensive rise in the number of U.S. SOF carrying out training
in unconventional warfare techniques.110 This requires political will
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and direction, as well as provision of more effective equipment and
materials to the trainers for use during training. There is little point
in assisting these forces by providing training using equipment that
does not stay with the recipients. Likewise, the best quality and
most cost effective training is provided through MTTs, which can be
deployed to the host nation and encompass whole unit training.111
Ofﬁcers in Central Asia should also be exposed to improved
psychological training, widening their horizons by teaching them
political and social awareness. The future success of these militaries
will depend upon the creation of a new generation of ofﬁcers capable
of leading their armed forces in the 21st century, responding to the
evolving international and regional security environment.112 More
English language training is needed to facilitate interoperability
with Western militaries; enabling ofﬁcers to access English language
learning tools will be a key to closer integration with the West.
However, in some cases C2 breaks down within the region, through
language barriers that reﬂect the rapid changes in the ethnic
composition of the post-Soviet legacy forces. In Uzbekistan, for
example, most ofﬁcers speak Russian and Uzbek, while the soldiers,
whether contract or conscript speak only Uzbek. Though the Uzbeks
are working toward more Uzbek language courses for their ofﬁcers,
assistance would speed up this process.113
Another key factor on enhanced training in the region,
inculcating more independence in the junior ofﬁcers, would involve
access to e-learning tools. Through such promotion of self-training,
an Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) option within the ofﬁcers’
ordinary training cycles would stimulate self-awareness and
professional development.114
They also require more use of a modeling and simulation system,
providing Computer Assisted Exercises. This is a cost effective way
of training the individuals, staffs, combat teams or multiple combat
formations, and may be used to diversify the standard scenarios
of conventional military exercises held within the CIS.115 All too
often their exercises are inﬂexible and show little awareness of the
potential of terrorist groups to vary their targets and strategies.
Doctrinal awareness of the nature of low-intensity conﬂict, stability
operations, and counterterrorist operations needs to be developed at
the theoretical level. These militaries were originally designed by the
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Soviets for large-scale conventional war, using divisions and carrying
out operations on a massive scale. Within the military academies,
they must break this mold and develop or embrace new doctrinal
manuals and begin teaching the basics of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism.116 Ofﬁcers must learn basic practices associated
with counterterrorism, such as setting up roadblocks, vehicle
searches, etc.
Effective training is only one of the building blocks needed in
developing the antiterrorist capabilities of these militaries. Despite
their best efforts and most ﬁnancial resources being funneled
towards the SOF in each state, they lack basic kit and advanced
weaponry. For instance, they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to obtain a clear picture
of the battle space, lacking C4ISR equipment and remote sensors.
The region’s SOF require the type of equipment that will enhance
their operational mobility and generally improve their combat
capabilities. This includes night-vision equipment and thermal
sights; modern sniper weapons; communication equipment at
operational and tactical level; modern individual and crew-served
weapons with sufﬁcient quantities of ammunition to train with them;
light-weight and functional body armor capable of giving adequate
protection against a 7.62mm round; body armor to protect against
fragmentation weapons; gas masks; protective head gear; spare parts
to assist in repairing the Soviet era equipment they possess; Global
Position System (GPS); communications equipment to enhance C3I;
mobile sensors; armored mobile vehicles such as the HMMWV; and
helicopters for greater small unit mobility.117 It is also important to
stress the fundamental requirement for engineers and support staff
being sent the host nation before, during and after the supply of any
Western equipment; the regional militaries are not automatically
capable of carrying out their maintenance and repairs.118
Furthermore, speciﬁc needs such as mobile sensors, which are
essential for use by SOF, would enable the local SOF to “watch” for
trafﬁc in unusual places, or could be utilized in aiding the security of
remote or inaccessible areas in the mountains, through which drug
trafﬁckers and militants may seek to pass. In particular a Remote
Battleﬁeld Sensor System (REMBASS) would allow greater awareness
of movements and potentially dangerous incursions, ﬁlling the gaps
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along very extended and rugged borders and providing oversight of
remote trails into and out of the country 119
Small Units.
Their weaknesses are manifold, as observed in the use SOF
during the terrorist incursions within the region in 1999 and 2000.
These include unit movement, collective task proﬁciency, react-tocontact skills and individual marksmanship.120
More exercises, in-country whole unit training, military
exchanges inside the United States and other coalition partner
countries, as well as U.S. SOF military-military training are all useful.
Yet they need to be coupled with recognition that security can also
be enhanced by commitment to long-term military reform, especially
professionalization and development of an NCO corps with distinct
management/command responsibilities. This should include SOF
professionalization. Indeed, counterterrorist-operations demand
a high level of professionalism on the part of the ordinary soldier.
There is little doubt that creating professional armed forces within
Central Asia would result in greater security, deter some terrorist
activities and improve interoperability with western militaries.
Progress is being made toward professionalizing the armed forces
in Uzbekistan. There is evidence that Kazakhstan may be seriously
pursuing similar goals. But challenges remain within Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and especially Turkmenistan.121
Small units capable of mobile rapid reaction, professionally
trained and able to minimize the widening of local conﬂict by
using a “light touch” in their operations still require the operational
support of the other branches of the armed forces. The Central Asian
militaries will need upgraded airframes and platforms to facilitate
support operations, small unit insertion, battleﬁeld logistics, C2,
airborne ﬁre support, and reconnaissance.
Central Asian Train and Equip Program?
Growing support exists within the Central Asian militaries for
deeper engagement with the United States as well as expanded
participation within NATO’s PfP. Although the challenges are
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signiﬁcant, options for greater levels of successful engagement can
be found in examples from the experiences of the former Warsaw
Pact members, and indeed elsewhere within the former Soviet
republics.
In Eastern Europe, for instance, Romania faced the challenges
of poor unit readiness, questionable force capability and force
restructuring after the end of the Cold War. Its 812th Battalion,
“Carpathian Hawks,” successfully carried out joint missions in
Afghanistan under the operational command of the 1st Brigade
Task Force “Devil,” headed by U.S. Colonel John F. Campbell.122
At Kandahar, the “Carpathian Hawks” were responsible for base
security, patrols, data collecting, and information operations. They
also participated in complex reconnaissance and joint combat
missions.123 The undoubted success of the “Carpathian Hawks” lay
in their adoption of modern training methods and NATO standard
operating procedures, enhancing readiness and combat capability
and then gaining invaluable operational experience between 19962002 in various missions under UN and NATO command in Angola,
Bosnia, and Kosovo.124
The Georgian Model: GTEP.
A critical part of the U.S political and military assistance to Georgia
began in May 2002, with the implementation of the Georgia Train
and Equip Program (GTEP), costing $64 million. The program was
designed to run over 2 years, enhancing the antiterrorist capabilities
of the Georgian army, promoting their cooperation in the GWOT,
and helping to alleviate the tension created within the Georgian state
as a result of Chechen and other militants operating in the Pankisi
Gorge.125 This important security program is a time-phased training
program, conducted in-country in cooperation with the Georgian
MOD, with its prime focus on training the Georgian 16th Mountain
Battalion, 113th Light Infantry Battalion and 11th MRD.126 The initial
program, conducted under the command of Special Operations
Command Europe (SOCEUR), focused on the Georgian MOD and
Land Forces Command to enhance their effectiveness in creating
and sustaining standard operating procedures, training plans,
and a property accounting system.127 The curriculum consisted of
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performance-oriented practical exercises similar to those taught at
the U.S. National Defense University, Joint Forces Command, and
U.S. Army War College.
Tactical training, consisting of approximately 100 days per unit,
is designed to instruct the Georgian battalions in light infantry
tactics, platoon-level offensive and defensive operations, and
airmobile tactics. Its curriculum includes basic individual skills,
combat lifesaver, radio operator procedures, land navigation, human
rights education, and combat skills, including riﬂe marksmanship,
movement techniques, and squad and platoon tactics.128 The program
also ensures that those trained and entering service in the battalions
do so on a professional basis, signing contracts on completion of their
training, thus enhancing the status of the battalions.129 Furthermore,
the participation of Georgian border troops and two platoons from
the MVD ensures greater interoperability among the forces.130
The program has not been without its problems. Requests for
more equipment have been made by the Georgian MOD during the
course of the program, and there have been difﬁculties in persuading
the Georgian MOD to devise a blueprint for future training following
the scheduled departure of U.S. military advisors in 2004.131
Nonetheless, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff, praised the level of training during a visit to Georgia
in November 2002, equating it with what he would expect to see in
U.S. training of similar sized units.132
Adapting the Georgian Model.
Devising a version of GTEP for the enhancement of Central Asian
security is certainly a viable option, provided it can be formulated to
address the speciﬁc needs of the Central Asian militaries, enabling
them to develop their antiterrorist capabilities within a difﬁcult
and challenging operational environment. It must be coupled with
long-term interagency planning, and efforts to develop new levels
of regional security cooperation. Moreover, there is a vital role for
NATO to play in supporting and implementing such a program.
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CATEP.
CATEP regional centers should be established in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, and be open to full participation from all the Central
Asian militaries. NATO should play an active role through the PfP
program to further strengthen the international dimension of the
assistance program and expand the scope of its activities. Achieving
this would entail the following basic outline.
A Political Steering Group (PSG) would be formed to coordinate
the program, maximizing its efﬁciency and effectiveness. The
PSG would maintain control and direction over the multinational
program, supply political oversight of the Military Working Group;
and liaise between NATO and national governments. The PSG
should be restricted to NATO members and representatives for the
CA states. A military working group (MWG) would be responsible
for planning details and proposing further assistance required to the
PSG. It would facilitate pooling international expertise and scarce
resources in support of the CATEP; preparing an implementation
plan; and overseeing the execution of all aspects of the assistance
programs. CA states could provide representatives to participate in
the work of the MWG. Finally, a Training Assistance Sub-Working
Group (TASWG) would coordinate, manage, and oversee the
implementation of the MWGs’ training assistance programs. The
United States should assume chairmanship of the TASWG, with the
participation of other NATO members willing to become involved in
the program. See Figure 2.
At the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, NATO
Secretary-General Lord Robertson, stressed the importance of
closer links with Central Asia. The Alliance must secure the political
will to deepen PfP engagement in the region in the near future.
Russia ought to play a positive consultative role, in keeping with
the cooperative spirit being cultivated through the NATO-Russia
Council mechanism, though Moscow should not have a veto on
such a program.133 NATO has gained experience in dealing with
terrorism since 9/11 which its members can share with Central Asia.
It can also encourage these partner states to utilize Article VIII of the
NATO Charter, in seeking additional security assistance programs
and antiterrorism training.134
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Country

Proposed Role

Canada

Member, PSG and MWG; Possible Chairman, MWG and PSG.

Denmark

Possible Member, MWG and TASWG; and provision of trainers and
training assistance.

France

Member, PSG and MWG, Chairman of TASWG; provision of training
assistance.

Germany

Possible Chairman, PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance.

Italy

Member PSG and/or MWG.

Netherlands

Member, PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance.

Poland

Member, MWG; Member TASWG; provision of trainers and access to
its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Turkey

Member of PSG and MWG; provision of training assistance and access
to its training facilities for CATEP personnel.

UK

Member, PSG, MWG, and TASWG; provision of trainers and access to
its training centers for CATEP personnel.

United States

Member, PSG and MWG; Chairman of TASWG; alternative Chairman
of PSG or MWG; provision of training assistance and access to its
training centers for CATEP personnel.

Figure 2. Possible NATO Participants in CATEP Support
Structure.
Many NATO members are actively engaged in Central
Asia through bilateral assistance programs. NATO PfP nations
could also join this assistance effort. In particular, the Baltic
States, with their experience of English Language Training,
could play an invaluable role. (See Figure 3.) Moreover, other
PfP members such as Ukraine have good facilities for exercises
and have recently held multilateral military exercises at
their Yarovsky ﬁring range in the Lvov region, aimed at improving
antiterrorist operations; these witnessed the participation of Austria,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldavia,
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Country

Proposed Role

Estonia

Member TASWG; provision of trainers and ELT assistance and access to
its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Latvia

Member TASWG; provision of trainers and ELT assistance and access to
its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Sweden

Access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Ukraine

Provision of trainers and access to its facilities for CATEP personnel.

Figure 3. Possible NATO PfP Participants in CATEP Support
Structure.
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Figure 4. Proposed First Year Outline for CATEP.136
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Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, United States, Turkey,
and Ukraine.135
The key to success will be the development of a systematic and
well-coordinated assistance program that focuses on improving the
capabilities of each of the CA member states. The ﬁrst step is breaking
the local militaries’ ties to their Soviet legacy and developing a
building block training support program that will allow them
to do this. In the end, the U.S. and NATO participants hope that
the resulting forces/formations will have improved operational
capability against the terrorist threat and will be better prepared, if
necessary, to operate in concert with Western forces.
The proposed ﬁrst-year training program outlined in Figure
4 would be an initial step towards implementing the CATEP. At
the end of its ﬁrst year, the antiterrorist capabilities of the region’s
militaries would not be greatly enhanced, but the organization will
be in place, with training programs speciﬁcally designed to meet the
needs of the local militaries, conducted by experienced or trained
personnel, and with the training support and management systems
that will help them to develop their own future training systems
with greater effectiveness.
1. ELT. An essential building bloc for the program will be ELT,
designed and implemented by teaching those who will in turn train
their rank and ﬁle; language laboratories are insufﬁcient to guarantee
success in this vital area.
2. Revise the annual training plan. This needs to be done in
conjunction with the CA MODs, addressing the on-going needs of
the program and promoting greater efﬁciency in the management of
the MODs.
3. Develop a detailed curriculum. This will cover all the
aspects of SOF operations, conducting antiterrorist operations and
incorporating the necessary ﬂexibility to meet the requirements of
the various militaries and types of formations, especially local SOF.
4. Prepare instructors for antiterrorist SOF training. Designed
as a train-the-trainers package, this should concentrate on the
leadership cadre and foster inoperability and individual initiative.
5. SOF Staff management training. This should place particular
emphasis upon encouraging delegation of responsibility down
the chain of command, thus fostering individual responsibility
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and initiative at the small unit level, so necessary for antiterrorist
operations.
6. The ELT and military training antiterrorist cadre. This would
also include training that is topic speciﬁc for unit leaders, ofﬁcers,
and NCOs. It would comprise C3I issues, use of intelligence and
the supporting roles of air, logistics, MEDEVAC, operating with
coalition forces, etc.
7. Operational and tactical intelligence training. This should
prepare the leadership and NCOs in the full use of intelligence
assets, including SOF units used in intelligence gathering missions,
to achieve full-spectrum dominance of the enemy in battle. Military
intelligence failings contributed signiﬁcantly to the weaknesses of
the antititerrorist campaigns in the Batken in 1999 and 2000.
8. NATO SOF unit training. This will establish the basis for
NATO operational practices and enhance the scope for future joint
operations.
9. Counterterrorist operations in special conditions. Given
the diverse topography of Central Asia, this should prepare elite
units for conducting operations under special conditions such as
mountainous or desert terrain.
10. Consolidated antiterrorist exercise. This will allow detailed
assessment of progress and revision of new skills absorbed during
the training cycle.137
Developing the antiterrorist capabilities of the Central Asian
militaries will involve the formulation of an antiterrorist training
cadre in each state―a crucial element in establishing a CATEP.
The long-term aim is the development of an independent, national
training capability for these elite units, rather than reliance on
foreign assistance. The security problems presented by the specter of
terrorism can only be met by these countries themselves in the long
term, through the development of effective, professionally trained
elite units. The West has an undoubted assistance role to play, but
it can only do so with the political support and commitment of the
Central Asian Republics.

33

ENDNOTES
1. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People,” United States Capitol, Washington, DC, September 20, 2001,
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
2. Robert G. Kaiser, “U.S. Plants Footprint in Shaky Central Asia,” Washington
Post, August 27, 2002.
3. Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), Foreign
Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, January 6, 2003.
4. Col. Robert C. McMullin, “Caspian Sea Regional Security in the 21st
Century,” USAWC, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA, April 2003, p. 16; Lyle J. Goldstein, “Making the Most of Central
Asian Partnerships,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2002, pp. 82-90.
5. Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, Released by the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department, April 30, 2003, www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/
pgtrpt/2002/html/19984.htm.
6. They also report to the Kazakh mission at NATO HQ, Brussels, acting as
a useful facilitator in the deployment of 25 Kazakh military specialists to Iraq
in support of the international peacekeeping operation. Uzbekistan was the
ﬁrst Central Asian state to send a small team of representatives to CENTCOM,
sending four ofﬁcers in December 2001; Kyrgyzstan followed by sending ﬁve
ofﬁcers in May 2002; and Tajikistan shortly afterwards assigned four liaison
ofﬁcers to CENTCOM. See www.centcom-mil/operations/coalition/coalition-pages/
kazakhstan.htm.
7. Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States”; “International Contributions to
the War Against Terrorism,” U.S. Department of Defense Fact Sheet, June 7, 2002,
www.defenselink-mil/news/Jun2002/d20020607contributions.pdf.
8. Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, Former Commander U.S. Central
Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, July 9, 2003, p. 15.
9. In using the word “region” in referring to Central Asia, it is important to
remember that it is not a region in any sense other than geographically; there is no
recent history of the formation of a real political, economic, and security regional
based approach. The long-term aim of western engagement is partly to foster the
development of genuine regional cooperation on security and other issues: ﬁrst the
Central Asian governments must be dissuaded from any isolationist tendencies,
while developing interstate trust.

34

10. Elizabeth Jones, “U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Staying our Course Along the Silk Road,” Speech delivered at the University of
Montana, Missoula, MT, April 10, 2003; See Elizabeth Wishnick, Growing U.S.
Security Concerns in Central Asia, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, October 2002.
11. Atlas Des d’Orient, La Découverte, 2002; William D. O’Malley, “Central
Asia and South Caucasus as an Area of Operations: Challenges and Constraints,”
Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, eds., Faultlines of Conﬂict in Central Asia and the
South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, pp. 272276.
12. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 15, 2003; See Tamara Makarenko,
“The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
February 2002.
13. Some of these, such as Adolot, are registered as political parties and seek
the opportunity of standing in an election, while the regimes themselves contribute
to the problem by refusing to open their political systems to greater democracy,
thus risking radicalizing the opposition in many cases; Vecherniy Bishkek, Bishkek,
May 28, 1999; M. Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia, New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1995; Nancy Lubin and Barnett Rubin, Calming the Ferghana
Valley. Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, New York: Century
Foundation, 1999; “Incubators of Conﬂict: Central Asia’s Localized Poverty and
Social Unrest,” ICG, Asia Report, No. 16, Osh/Brussels, 2001; Michael Fredholm,
Uzbekistan and the Threat From Islamic Extremism, K39, CSRC: Camberley, March
2003.
14. “Russian FSB Detains 121 Suspected Members of Banned Islamic Salvation
Party,” Kavkazskiy Uzel, June 9, 2003; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, June 18, 2003, p.
4.
15. Another important dimension in the GWOT is the prevention of failing
states being used, such as Afghanistan was used by al Qaeda and the Taliban, as
harbingers of international terrorism. Likewise, the economically weaker Central
Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, must not become
the future breeding grounds for international terrorists; otherwise the problem is
simply shifted around without any resolution.
16. Ibid; Central Asian militants have probably exaggerated the idea of a panAsiatic movement, scaring the authorities as a consequence. The IPT may never
have existed in reality.
17. Khabar Television, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, July 16, 2003.

35

18. The Military Balance, 2003-04, Oxford, England: International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), 2003, p. 22.
19. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, July 1, 2003, p. 5.
20. Krygyzstan has suffered a series of terrorist attacks in recent months,
leaving 28 dead. In addition to an attack on a bus on December 26, 2002, a bomb
planted in a Bishkek market place killed 7 and wounded another 40. Hamid
Toursunof, “Turkestan: A New Terrorist Nexus? Kyrygz Authorities Warn that
Chinese Separatists, the IMU, and Hizb ut-Tahrir are Joining Forces,” Week in
Review, July 8–14, 2003, Transitions Online, July 14, 2003.
21. The UN and the U.S. State Department both have ofﬁcially proscribed this
terrorist organization. Xu Tau, “Extremist Threat in Northwestern China,” Central
Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5, 2000, p. 85.
22. Khabar Television, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, 1400 GMT, July 11,
2003; Novye Izvestia, Moscow, July 22, 2003, p. 5.
23. Berlingske Tidende, Copenhagen, BBC Monitoring Service, June 10, 2003;
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow, June 18, 2003, p. 4.
24. Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism,
and Regional Stability,” Testimony Before the U.S. Congress, Committee on
International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, July
23, 2003.
25. Bakhram Turnasov, “Extremism in Uzbekistan,” K33, Conﬂict Studies
Research Center, RMA, Sandhurst, July 2002, p. 9.
26. The radical anti-western and anti-Semitic nature of its literature can be
seen on the groups website: www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org; “Radical Islam in Central Asia:
Responding to Hizb-ut-Tahrir,” International Crisis Group, Osh/Brussels, June 30,
2003; Ariel Cohen, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir: an Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central
Asia,” Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, May 30, 2003, www.heritage.org/
Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm; Ariel Cohen, “Have American Ofﬁcials
Identiﬁed a New Threat in Central Asia?,” Eurasianet, June 24, 2003; Izvestia,
Moscow, July 4, 2003, p. 4.
27. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People,” United States Capitol, Washington, DC, www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
28. Vecherniy Bishkek, Bishkek, April 30 2003; Biznes I Politika, Dushanbe, BBC
Monitoring Service, February 21, 2003, pp. 1-2; Michael Lueders, “Borderland:
Power and Faith in Central Asia,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, March 31, 2003.

36

29. Extreme caution should be exercised in comparing Islamic extremism in
Central Asia with the Middle East. The practice of religion differs signiﬁcantly,
while there is no “struggle for homeland liberation” paradigm as in the Middle
East. The ethnic politics are very different and the average village dweller in
Central Asia does not care about Israel; while the U.S. dynamics at play are also
distinct. See further Tamara Makarenko, “The Rising Threat of Militant Islam
in Central Asia,” M. Ranstrop, ed., Islamic Extremism and Terrorism in the Greater
Middle East, Hurst & Co: London, 2003.
30. Vitaly V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies,
University of California, Berkeley, Spring 2003.
31. Fiona Hill, “Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional
Stability,” House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the
Middle East and Central Asia, July 23, 2003; Alisher Khamidov, “Countering the
Call: The U.S., Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and Religious Extremism in Central Asia,” Muskie
Fellow in International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, U.S. Policy
Towards the Islamic World, Analysis Paper #4, The Brookings Institution, July 2003,
www.brook.edu/fp/saban/khamidov20030701.pdf.
32. “Review of the Implementation of OSCE Commitments to Prevent and
Combat Terrorism,” OSCE, June 10, 2003.
33. Author discussions with Western intelligence services.
34. FEMA existed as an independent agency until March 2003 when it became
part of the Department of Homeland Security, www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm.
35. See “Central Asia: the Politics of Police Reform,” International Crisis
Group, Brussels/Osh, December 2002; British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC),
tasked with producing intelligence assessments for senior policymakers, has long
involved the CIA in its work, and vice-versa. Israel has been effective in developing
good intelligence liaison links with the intelligence services of Arab states
including Jordan; Stéphane Lefebvre, “International Intelligence Cooperation:
Difﬁculties and Dilemmas,” Colloque Renseignement et Sécurité Internationale, Laval
University, Quebec, March 20, 2003, (forthcoming in the International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence).
36. Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors
2001,” CRS Report for Congress, Library of Congress, September 10 2001, p. 16.
37. Sultan Jumagulov and Kubut Otorbaev, “Kyrgyz IMU Fears Mount,”
IWPR, August 3, 2001, www.iwpr.net.

37

38. David Filipov, “Islamic Rebels Thrive in Central Asia,” The Boston Globe,
December 31, 2000.
39. ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS)-SOV1999-1002, October 2, 1999; ITAR-TASS, Moscow, September 20, 1999; Interfax,
Moscow, October 2, 1999.
40. Bakhrom Tursunov and Marina Pikulina, Severe Lessons of Batken,
Camberley, England: K28, Conﬂict Studies Research Center (CSRC), pp. 8-10;
Asel Otorbaeva, “Kyrgyz Private Relives Batken Nightmare,” IWPR, September 1,
2000.
41. Kyrgyz soldiers were issued with old Soviet manpad radios, and many
failed to work in the ﬁeld, making it impossible to coordinate ground and air
elements or receive and convey intelligence. They were promised $50 per day
and received only a fraction of that amount. The Kyrgyz government evidently
believed a show of force could affect the end of the incursion, deploying troops
without adequate training or equipment to respond to the threat.
42. The militants were armed with Kalashnikov assault riﬂes and their rounds
would not be stopped by the helmets issued to the Kyrgyz soldiers; Otorbaeva,
“Kyrgyz Private Relives Batken Nightmare,” Military Parade, www.milparade.com/
ra/content1.htm.
43. One Kyrgyz ofﬁcer later recounted the extent of their predicament:
Only we and the police special forces were left. Two generals
commanded them, Isakov and Sadiev. The operation led to nothing. In
approaching the place, a militant ﬁred a shot from a sniper riﬂe and hit
a soldier in the leg. After that, the detachment waited a little more and
left empty-handed. And what we were dealing with was only a band
numbering 25-30.
Vecherniy Bishkek, Bishkek, August 23, 2002.
44. Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 5, No. 162, September
3, 1999; Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 5, No. 173, September
21, 1999.
45. Leonid Bondarets, “On the Optimization of the Defense and Security
Systems,” George C. Marshall Center, 2000; Interfax, Tashkent, FBIS-SOV-19991129, November 29, 1999.
46. BBC Monitoring Service, London, April 24, 2000.

38

47. BBC Monitoring Service, August 20, 2000; BBC Monitoring Service, August
27, 2000.
48. Novye Izvestia, Moscow, July 23, 2003, p. 1.
49. Turat Akimov, “Batken Conﬂict Returns,” IWPR, August 18, 2000.
50. Bondarets, “On the Optimization of the Defense and Security Systems,”
2000.
51. Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Security Agenda in Central Asia,” Central
Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 2, No. 14, Information and Analytical Center, Sweden,
2002, pp. 16-23.
52. M. J. Orr, “The Russian Garrison in Tajikistan―201st Gatchina Twice Red
Banner Motor Riﬂe Division,” Occasional Brief No. 85, Camberley, England: CSRC,
October 2001, pp. 5-6.
53. The Russian military have well-known reservations concerning the
continued presence of U.S. and NATO forces within Central Asia, and were
reportedly dismayed by the 3-year extension of the lease agreement between
the United States and Kyrgyzstan for the coalition base at Manas, Bishkek. See
Kommersant, Moscow, August 13, 2003.
54. McDermott, “Russia’s Security Agenda in Central Asia”; Marcel de Haas,
“The Development of Russia’s Security Policy 1992-2002,” in Anne C. Aldis and
Roger N. McDermott, eds., Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, London/Portland,
OR: Frank Cass, 2003, pp. 3-21.
55. The CRDF is divided into three operational zones―Western Zone (Russia
and Belarus), Caucasus Zone (Russia and Armenia) and the Central Asian Zone
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).
56. Kenley Butler, “Internal Conﬂicts and Security Concerns in Central
Asia and Afghanistan,” NIS Nonproliferation Program, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/caconf.htm.
57. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 21, 2003, p. 9.
58. Bordyuzha graduated from the Perm Higher Command and Engineering
School in 1972 and then entered the KGB, where he remained until 1992. Between
1992-95 he was Deputy Commander of the Federal Border Troops, and between
1995-98, he was Deputy Commander of the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS)
before being appointed to the presidential administration. See Kommersant,
Moscow, April 24, 2003, p. 4; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, May 12, 2003, p. 10.

39

59. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, April 19 2003, p. 2.
60. Interfax, Moscow, May 16, 2002.
Ibid.

61. It retains a total strength of around 1,300 troops, as of September 2003;

62. See William D. O’Malley and Roger N. McDermott, “Kyrgyzstan’s
Security Tightrope: Balancing its Relations Between Moscow and Washington,”
FMSO, Fort Leavenworth: KS, 2003.
63. Miriam Arunova, “The CIS: Summing up the Past Decade and Future
Prospects,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 3, No. 15, 2002, pp. 14-16.
64. Ibid.
65. Interfax, Moscow, September 18, 2002.
66. Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 7, No. 108, June 5, 2001; Sophie
Lambroschini, “Central Asia: CIS Plans Rapid-Reaction Force to Fight
Terrorism,” RFE/RL Newsline, May 22, 2001, www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/05/
22052001112028.asp.
67. Vremya Novostei, Moscow, April 4, 2002.
68. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 23, 2002.
69. ITAR-TASS, Moscow, 1327 GMT, BBC Monitoring Service, June 13, 2002.
70. Ibid.
71. Khabar TV, Almaty, April 18, 2002; Interfax, Moscow, BBC Monitoring
Service, April 23, 2002; AKIpress website, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, June 12,
2002; Asia-Plus News Agency, Dushanbe, BBC Monitoring Service, 0946 GMT, June
14, 2002; M. J. Orr, “Better or Just Not so Bad? An Evaluation of Russian Combat
Effectiveness in the Second Chechen War,” The Second Chechen War, p. 94.
72. The 100-megawatt transmitter reportedly receives signals from two
satellites simultaneously. See Channel One TV, Moscow, BBC Monitoring Service,
0800 GMT, April 4, 2003.
73. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow, April 7, 2003, p. EV.
74. ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, April 8, 2003.

40

75. The Military Balance, 2003-04, Oxford, England: IISS, 2003, pp. 22-23.
76. The six member states of the SCO are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
77. Zulﬁa Rakhimova, “Uzbekistan in GUUAM and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 5, No. 11, 2001, pp. 158-168;
Alexander Lukin, “China Advancing Bilateral Cooperation,” International Affairs,
Vol. 48, No. 1, 2002, pp. 141-152.
78. Bruce Pannier, “Central Asia: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Summit Ends,” RFE/RL, Prague, June 15, 2001; Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, BBC
Monitoring Service, 0848 GMT, January 7, 2002; Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, BBC
Monitoring Service, 1043 GMT, May 15, 2002; Izvestia, Moscow, June 7, 2002, p. 4;
Parlamentskaya Gazeta, Moscow, June 8, 2002, p. 1.
79. Xing Guangcheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the Fight
Against Terrorism, Extremism and Separatism,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol.
4, No. 16, 2002, p. 16.
80. Kyrgyz-Press International News Agency, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service,
1425 GMT, April 1, 2003; ITAR-TASS, Moscow, August 6, 2003.
81. Interfax, Bishkek, FBIS-SOV-2002-1226, December 26, 2002.
82. Public Educational Radio and TV, Bishkek, BBC Monitoring Service, 1430
GMT, October 14, 2002; Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, FBIS-CHI-2002-1224,
December 24, 2002.
83. Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, (Internet Version), BBC Monitoring Service, June 4,
2003; ITAR-TASS, Moscow, August 6, 2003; People’s Daily Online, Beijing, August
13, 2003; Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, August 12, 2003, p. 1.
84. Interfax, Moscow, July 17, 2002.
85. Pavel Baev, “The Challenge of “Small Wars” for the Russian Military,” in
Aldis and McDermott, eds., Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, pp. 189-208.
86. Roger N. McDermott, “Putin’s Military Priorities: The Modernization of
the Armed Forces,” in Aldis and McDermott, eds., Russian Military Reform 19922002, pp. 259-277.
87. An Interview With General Anthony Zinni, “Russia and the Middle East,”
Washington Proﬁle News Agency, May 19, 2003, www.washproﬁle.org.

41

88. Sam Perlo-Freeman and Peter Stalenheim, “Military Expenditure in the
South Caucasus and Central Asia,” in Alyson J. K. Bailes, et al., Armament and
Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, July
2003, pp. 15-20; Chris Hill and Peter Sutcliffe, “An Economic Analysis of Military
Expenditure Levels in Central Asia and Transcaucasia,” NATO Colloquim 2001, pp.
271-90, www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/colloq01.htm.
89. The Military Balance, 1992-03 to 2002-03, Oxford, England: IISS.
90. I am making a clear distinction between forces whose function is to carry
out combat operations (SOF) and those that are referred to as Special Forces,
which are in fact combined forces with special designated tasks: chemical units,
construction units, engineering units, intelligence units, signal units, medical
units, and topography and cartography units.
91. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Russia and the CIS, Issue 11, 2002, pp.
819, 827, 829.
92. Author interviews with Western military ofﬁcers.
93. Ibid.
94. Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, pp. 286, 295-296.
95. Edward F. Bruner, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Special
Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for
Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division,
October 15, 2001; author interviews with Western military ofﬁcers.
96. See 7 acs/7 sof/7 sos History, via www.7thsos.com/History.htm.
97. See Shamil Gareyev, “Military Cooperation: Uzbekistan and the
U.S.A.,” Winter 1997-98, www.pacom.mil/forum/UZBEK.html. Four of the
Central Asian Republics joined NATO’s PfP in 1994, Tajikistan ﬁnally joined
in 2002. On multilateral military exercises, see J. Moffat, “Central Asia: U.S. to
Participate in Joint Military Exercise,” RFE/RL, August 29, 1997; “NATO PfP
Exercise Cooperative Nugget 97,” www.saclant.nato.int/pio/EVENTS/Exercises/
COOP%20Nugget/cn97.htm; “Fact Sheet on Centrasbat 2000,” www.usembassy.uz/
centcom/military.htm.
98. See: Major William M. Tart, “Ethnic Conﬂict and CENTCOM Policy for
the Central Asian Republics,” Air Command Staff College, Air University, AU/
ACSC/175/2000-04, April 2000.
99. Turkmenistan has been the exception, seeking to eschew foreign military
contacts.

42

100. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Central Asian Partners: Low Key Spadework
by Green Berets Reaps Valuable Beneﬁts for War in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces
Journal International, January 2002, p. 60.
101. These programs were as follows: Collaborative Research Program,
Department of Health and Human Services–BTEP, Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention, Materials Protection, Control & Accounting, Export Control Program
(Nuclear), Arms Control Support, IMET, Counterproliferation, Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Fund, FMF, Science Centers, Export Control and Border Security,
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA), Comprehensive Threat Reduction, Customs
Border Security and Counterproliferation, DoD/FBI Counterproliferation, and
Civilian R&D Foundation. See Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States.”
102. Ibid.
103. No FMF funds were assigned to Turkmenistan in the FY 2002.
104. The Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) funds were Kazakhstan,
$2,660,000; Kyrgyzstan, $2,000,000; Tajikistan, $7,500,000; Turkmenistan,
$5,000,000; and Uzbekistan, $4,300,000. These were broadly in line with the
prioritizing of border security in the region in an attempt to counter the ﬂow of
narcotics, arms, militants. and illegal migration. See “U.S. Government Assistance
to and Cooperative Activities With Eurasia,” FY 2002 Annual Report, Prepared by
the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, U.S. State
Department, January 2003.
105. Anthony Davis, “U.S. Special Forces Train Kyrgyz Units,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, August 29, 2001.
106. The Times, London, March 30, 2002, p. 20.
107. Interfax, Moscow, January 24, 2003.
108. Author interviews with Western military ofﬁcers.
109. Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, Vol. 6, No. 171, September
15, 2000.
110. Author interviews with U.S. SOF.
111. Author interviews with Western military ofﬁcers.
112. The United States and NATO are currently moving away from the view
of the armed forces existing for the defense of territory to the defense of values.

43

Such a revolution in military terms will generate experience that will be invaluable
if shared with partner states in Central Asia; they also must face such challenges,
since their main threat parameters are not about the defense of territory.
113. Author’s interview with the MOD of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
114. Ibid.
115. Author interviews with Central Asian military ofﬁcers.
116. An article that appeared in the Russian Armeyskiy Sbornik in October
2002 illustrated adequately the limited nature of Russian counterinsurgency
theory, despite the Russian armed forces being so heavily involved in “small
wars” during the last decade. Russian military journals have continued to stick
doggedly in this period to analysis of general war, rather than what is termed
“operations other than war.” Both the organization and tactics explored within
the article were presented in very vague terms, consequently of questionable
value as an aid to training soldiers in counterinsurgency. See Colonel Sergey
Batyushkin, Relying on Surprise, Camberley, England: CSRC, UK Translation
606, October 2002. Since the Central Asian militaries share a Soviet heritage, they
likewise suffer from unsophisticated and underdeveloped doctrinal and training
manuals for counterinsurgency operations, within their academies and military
education facilities. The one regional exception at present is Uzbekistan; since
9/11, the Uzbek Armed Forces Academy in Tashkent has run counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency lectures, though it still needs further support and assistance in
strengthening this component of its training and education programs.
117. Author interviews with Western and Central Asian military ofﬁcers.
U.S. SOF use communications systems such as the Special Mission Radio System
(SMRS) and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS); such systems would radically
improve communications within the Central Asian SOF.
118. There are reported cases of Kazakh soldiers being killed in mobile
vehicles that have been supplied to Kazakhstan simply because they did not
properly prepare their soldiers in their use. Equally, Naval Cutters that have
been supplied to the embryonic Kazakh Navy have been subjected to a lack of
maintenance skills. During the 1990s, when the U.K. supplied Challenger tanks to
Jordan, the ﬁrst step was precisely this task of dispatching engineers to teach the
necessary basic maintenance skills.
119. Author interviews with U.S. SOF. The system operates on the basis of
collecting information in response to seismic-acoustic energy, magnetic ﬁeld
changes and changes to the infrared ﬁeld production. It can, therefore, detect
movement of enemy personnel and vehicles, processing the information and
transmitting the information in short bursts to a system monitor set. It can be used
to produce a time-phased record of enemy activity. The I-REMBASS is designed

44

for SOF use, but is smaller and lighter. See www.usaic.hua.army.mil/SCHOOL/
111MI/309th/96R/rembass.htm.
120. Author interviews with Western military ofﬁcers.
121. Murat T. Laumulin, “The Armed Forces, Military Reform and Civilian
Control Over the Security Structure in Kazakhstan,” Institute for Strategic
Studies Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2003, www.kisi.kz/English/
Our_publications/Laumulin_1_en.html; O’Malley and McDermott, “Kyrgyzstan’s
Security Tightrope”; Rustam Burnashev and Irina Chernykh, “The Armed Forces
of the Republic of Tajikistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 6, No. 18, 2002, pp.
93-105; Anton Alexeyev, “The Armed Forces of Turkmenistan,” Paper Presented
at the Department of Oriental Studies of St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg,
2002; Sergey Masurenko, “Civil-Military Relations in Uzbekistan and the Reform
of the Armed Forces,” PfP Consortium, Security Sector Reform Working Group
Meeting, NATO Defense College, Rome, April 7-8, 2003; Author interviews with
Central Asian military ofﬁcers.
122. Bucharest Ziua, (Internet Version), Bucharest, June 11, 2003.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Prime-News, News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1130 GMT,
November 27, 2002.
126. The program beaks down as follows: Phase I: logistics and engineering;
Phases IIA and IIB: military joint doctrine, C2, staff/organizational training for the
Georgian MOD and Land Forces Command; Phase IIIA: Unit level tactical training
of the Georgian Commando Battalion; Phase IIIB: Unit level tactical training and
specialized military mountaineering training for the 16th Mountain Battalion;
Phase IIIC: training the 560 man 113th Light Infantry Battalion/11th MRD to
conduct patrol base operations, ambush procedures, urban terrain operations,
long-range patrols, platoon level raids, and daylight company-level attacks and
night defensive operations.
127. “Georgia Train and Equip Program Begins,” U.S. Department of Defense,
April 29, 2002, www.defenselink.mil/news.
128. Ibid.
129. Kavkasia-Press News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1303 GMT,
May 22, 2003.

45

130. Rustavi-2 TV, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1000 GMT, May 23. 2003.
131. Eric A. Miller, “Morale of U.S. Trained Troops in Georgia is High, But
U.S. Advisors Concerned About Sustainability,” Eurasia Insight, Eurasianet, May
5, 2003, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050503_pr.shtml.
132. Prime-News, News Agency, Tbilisi, BBC Monitoring Service, 1130 GMT,
November 27. 2002.
133. Russia has proven uncomfortable with the entry of U.S military forces
into Central Asia, which traditionally it has regarded as being in its own sphere of
inﬂuence. In February 2003, Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister, called on the
UN Security Council to establish “time-frames” for limiting the duration of the
U.S. military presence in the region. Moreover, the Russian military press often
portrays the basing of U.S. and Western forces in Central Asia in sinister terms,
believing it goes beyond supporting the GWOT. See Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow,
July 15, 2003.
134. NATO
b541023u.htm.

Basic

Texts,

April

11,

2000,

www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/

135. RIA, Oreanda, Kiev, July 21, 2003.
136. The provisional ﬁrst year program focuses on inculcating the prerequisite
leadership skills among the ofﬁcer corps within the region’s militaries.
137. An enhanced and further reﬁned second-year program would follow,
consolidating the ﬁrst-year achievements and concentrating on antiterrorist small
unit training. At that stage, drawing on the U.S. military engagement experience
gained in Georgia through the GTEP, follow-up work would begin with the
region’s MODs, constructing appropriate blueprints for how the host nations will
continue training their antiterrorist forces after the completion of the program.

46

